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This thesis uses education as a dependent variable to examine the 
intra-household distribution of resources to children in China from the following two 
aspects: (1) the gender bias, (2) the quantity-quality tradeoff of children. We find that 
gender bias against girls only exists in rural China and only for children of the older 
birth cohorts. We also find that for the rural sample, female-headed households tend to 
favor the education of girls, and both the education level of fathers and higher 
household income per capita help to reduce the gender bias. However, we do not find 
that having the second or more children or the birth order of children changes the 
gender bias. Finally, we examine whether there is a quantity-quality tradeoff of 
children. By directly employing the one-child policy variable as an instrumental 
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1 Introduction 
Parents' decisions on intra-household allocation of resources among children 
have a great impact on child development, health, education, which will in turn affect 
the future income of children (Haveman and Wolfe, 1995; Danziger and Waldfogel, 
2000; Young, 2002). With uneven intra-household distribution, higher household 
income does not necessarily mean that all children are equally better off (Haddad and 
Kanbur, 1990; Browning and Lechene, 2001; Quisumbing, 2003). In this thesis, we 
investigate intra-household allocation in China using child educational attainment as 
an indicator. In particular, we examine whether there is a gender bias in China in 
terms of the years of education children receive, how household characteristics and 
child birth order affect the magnitude of the gender bias, and whether the number of 
children affects the educational attainment of each child. 
How do parents allocate household resources among children greatly depends on 
the value of each child to parents. The value varies with a child's gender and age, the 
parents' education levels, as well as other child and household characteristics (Ahn， 
1995). When gender is a consideration, parents may very likely allocate more 
resources to children of one gender, normally boys, than the other gender. We call this 
gender bias. In China, boys are very likely to be preferred by parents and thus receive 
more education because boys are responsible for caring aging parents and because 
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boys can carry on the family name. Moreover, as women's income is widely believed 
to be significantly lower than men's, investing in boys may have a higher return even 
if both boys and girls share equally the duty of caring aging parents. 
There is a huge empirical literature that attempts to measure intra-household 
gender bias among children in developing countries, but no consensus has been 
reached so far. Some find that the gender bias exists in dimensions such as nutrition, 
health, and education (see e.g., Dreze and Sen, 1989; Harriss, 1990; Dasgupta, 1993; 
Strauss and Thomas, 1995; Ilahi, 2001; Kingdon, 2004). Others (eg. Subramaniam 
(1996) and Deaton (1998)) do not detect gender bias. 
Our first objective in this thesis is to examine whether there is a gender bias in 
China in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Drawing on China Heath and Nutrition 
Survey data collected by the Carolina Population Center, we find that the gender bias 
in education attainment against girls only existed for the 1989 sample, but not for the 
1991 and 1993 samples. Moreover, we only detect gender bias for the older birth 
cohorts of the 1989 sample. For younger cohorts, girls even had more education than 
boys. Further analysis using the urban and rural sample separately shows that all the 
detectable gender bias is attributable to the rural sample. 
In addition to examining gender bias across age groups, we are also interested in 
whether family characteristics and child birth order, which may affect resource 
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allocation on child education, have significant effects on gender bias. We find that for 
the rural sample, female-headed households tend to favor the education of girls, and 
both the education level of fathers and higher household income per capita help to 
reduce the gender bias. However, we do not find that having one more child or the 
mother's education affects the magnitude of gender bias. Our further analysis shows 
that although both the first and last births in a family receive more education than 
their siblings, girls of the first and last births are neither favored nor discriminated in 
terms of education. 
The second issue we investigate in this thesis is the quantity and quality tradeoff 
of children. The quantity-quality model, first introduced by Becker (1960) in 1960， 
suggests that the marginal cost of child quality rises with family size. One prediction 
of the model is that the increase of the total number of children will reduce the 
average quality of all children. However, as education and the number of children are 
both endogenous variables chosen by parents, the main difficulty of investigating the 
tradeoff is to identify the true casual effect of quantity on quality. For example, if 
families planned to invest less in child education also preferred to have more children, 
the negative correlation between quantity and quality estimated by ordinary least 
square regressions would not be their true casual relationship. In this thesis, we use 
the birth control policy as an instrumental variable to solve this endogeneity problem. 
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We indeed find that a quantity and quality tradeoff of children. 
The structure of this thesis is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data 
set and the main variables. Section 3 investigates the gender and birth-order effects on 
individual child's education, while section 4 analyzes the quantity-quality tradeoff. 
Section 5 concludes. 
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2 Data 
In this thesis, we use the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) data, which 
were collected by the Carolina Population Center (CPC) at the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill, the Institute of Nutrition and Food Hygiene, and the Chinese 
Academy of Preventive Medicine. The sample households were randomly drawn from 
eight provinces including Liaoning, Shandong, Jiangsu, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, 
Guangxi, and Guizhou. Two cities and four counties were sampled in each province. 
Four neighborhoods (including suburban villages) in each city, and one county-town 
neighborhood and three villages in each county, were then randomly selected. 
Approximately 20 households were sampled per neighborhood or village. 
The first survey was conducted in 1989. Follow-up surveys were conducted in 
1991，1993，1997 and 2000. Since the over-time changes of child education 
attainment and most of the independent variables are very small, we focus on 
cross-sectional analysis drawing on the 1989 data. We do use the 1991 and 1993 data 
to check whether there is any change in terms of gender bias across birth cohorts and 
ages.' 
This data set contains detailed information on characteristics of each individual 
living in the household, such as years of education, family position, as well as detailed 
‘ T h e 1997 and 2000 data are not perfectly compatible to early data. 
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household characteristics such as family income. It also contains a community survey 
which collects detailed community level information. We will draw on the birth 
control policy variable from the community survey for Chapter 4. 
In this thesis, we refer to "children" as those that are between 6 and 15 years old, 
who are expected to be in school. In China, the educational system is a ”6+3(+3+4)” 
scheme, which consists of six years of primary school, three year of junior secondary 
school, followed by three years of senior secondary or technical college, and four 
years of tertiary education.^ Primary education generally starts at the age of 6 and 
junior secondary school ends at the age of 15. In 1986，the People's Congress of 
China passed the education law, which enforces 9-year compulsory education for 
children who reach the age of 6. However, the law has not been very effective in rural 
areas, where it is normal to see children have delayed enrolment and drop out of 
school at early ages. Following the literature (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980; 
Subramaniam, 1996; Ota and Moffatt, 2002), we restrict the sample of children to be 
under 15 years old. We do so because these children are supposed to be in school and 
older children are more likely to move out of the household, which is not covered by 
the survey, and thus causes a sample selection problem. In total, we have 2417 
observations for the analysis of gender bias and 1920 observations for examining the 
2 Generally, most technical colleges offer three-year training, but some also offers 4-6 years of training 
which depends on the characteristics of the courses. This is also true for the tertiary education that 
some programs require 5 years to complete, such as Engineering and Architecture. 
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quantity-quality tradeoff. The descriptive statistics for the two samples are presented 
in Tables 1 and 2. 
Our dependent variable, total years of education, refers to the number of years of 
formal education completed by the child. On average, the sampled children are 10.8 
years old, who were expected to receive 4.8 years of education by 1989 (Table 1). 
However, they only received 4.2 years of education by 1989, which implies that on 
average, they have 0.6 years of delay in enrolment. The average years of education of 
fathers is 6.6 while that of mothers is 4.3. This shows that females from the last 
generation generally received 2.3 fewer years education than males. Among these 
2,417 children, 21 percent of them are from urban area, 36 percent are the only child 
of their families, and 9 percent are from families with female household heads. 
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3 Gender and Birth Order of children 
3.1 Hypothesis Development 
3.1.1 Gender Discrimination 
How do parents allocate household resources among children greatly depends on 
the value of each child to parents. The value varies with a child's gender and age, the 
parents' education levels, as well as other child and household characteristics (Ahn, 
1995). When gender is a consideration, parents may very likely to allocate more 
resources to children of one gender, normally boys, than the other gender. We call this 
gender bias. 
There is a huge empirical literature that attempts to measure intra-household 
gender bias among children in developing countries, but no consensus has been 
reached so far. Some find that gender bias exists in dimensions such as nutrition, 
health, and education (see e.g., Dreze and Sen, 1989; Harriss, 1990; Dasgupta, 1993; 
Strauss and Thomas, 1995; Ilahi, 2001; Kingdon, 2004). Others do not detect gender 
bias in their samples. For example, Subramaniam (1996) and Deaton (1998) use 
household level consumption data to analyze the intra-household allocation of 
resources. They find that the differential effects of gender composition in the 
allocation of resources derive entirely from the unobserved wealth effect, and the 
gender bias disappears after controlling for the fixed effect. 
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In this thesis, we focus on examining the gender bias in child education in China. 
In China, boys are very likely to be preferred by parents and thus receive more 
education for the following reasons. First, as an investment, a boy is for his parents' 
security in old age. This is especially true in rural areas, where there is no social 
security for old farmers, and where it is the son's responsibility to support and care for 
aging parents. From the parents' point of view, investing on boys will generate future 
income for the family for the whole life of parents, but investing on girls will only 
generate income until they are married to other families.) Second, in China, as well as 
in many developing countries, women's income is lower than men's, this will make 
investing in boys generate a higher return than in girls even if both share equally the 
responsibility of caring aging parents. Finally, a boy can carry on the family name, 
which is very important in the Chinese culture. Chinese families who do not have a 
son are discriminated against by friends and relatives because failure to carry on the 
family name is a serious sign of disrespect to ancestors."^ Because of these reasons, 
boys have higher investment value than girls. 
Our first hypothesis on gender bias is as follows: 
I^n China, especially in rural areas, after marriage, boys will live with their own parents, while girls 
will live with her husband's parents. 
“There is a saying in Chinese that describes this vividly: There are three disrespects we could have for 
our ancestors, not carrying on the family name is the biggest one ("bu xiao you san, wu hou wei da"). 
The discrimination can also be shown by two other Chinese sayings: "no sons, no grandsons" (duan zi 
jue sun), and "extinction of descendants" (jue hou), which are extremely negative sayings about a 
family. 
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Hypothesis 1: Among children with same age and similar family background, boys 
generally receive more education than girls. 
To test Hypothesis 1，we estimate the following equation, 
E 丨=a, + p f i i + P A + + P A G 丨 + X^p, +6, (1) 
where is the total years of education of child G, indicates the gender of the child 
which equals one for girls and zero for boys; Ai is the age of the child; and Xi is a 
vector of household variables including log household income per capita, parents' age 
and education, the female household head dummy, a urban dummy, and provincial 
dummies. The gender difference of education between boys and girls is 
In addition to examining gender bias across age groups, we are also interested in 
whether family characteristics, which may affect resource allocation on child 
education, have significant effects on gender bias. These characteristics include a 
dummy indicating whether a family has two or more children, household income per 
capita, the gender of household head, and parents' education levels. 
Having more children may increase the gender bias. More children in a family 
mean less resource for each child on average. However, if boys are preferred, their 
resources may be reduced less than girls with an additional child in the family. 
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Therefore, more children may lead to stronger gender bias against girls. 
Similarly, household income may also affect the size of gender bias. Lower 
income families face larger budget constraint in children education. Therefore, if boys 
are given higher priority in education than girls, girls from lower income families may 
receive less education than girls from higher income families, which means the size of 
gender bias may decrease with household income. 
Both the status of the mother and parental education levels are important in 
affecting resource allocation within a family. Prior research has found mothers are 
more likely to allocate more resources to girls, and thus the status and education of the 
mother is very important in reducing the gender bias against girls. For example, by 
using the data from the United States, Ghana, and Brazil, Thomas (1994) finds that 
mother's education has a larger effect on the daughter's height while father's 
education affects the son's height more. This implies that mothers allocate more 
resources to their daughters while fathers channel more resources towards their sons. 
To estimate the effect of these family characteristics on the size of gender bias, 
we have Hypothesis 2 as follows. 
Hypothesis 2: The education difference between boys and girls is smaller when the 
mother is the household head or has more education, and when household income is 
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higher; it is larger when the father has more education and there are more children in 
the households. 
To test Hypothesis 2, the following equation is set up by adding some interactive 
terms to equation (1): 
= a, + P\G 丨 + Mi + A 力,2 + M f i i + P 扎 + P.Hfi, + X^p, + … （2) 
where //, represents the household characteristics including the two-or-more children 
dummy, log household income per capita, the household head gender, and parents' 
education levels, and //, G, represents the interactive terms of gender with these 
variables. If hypothesis 2 is valid, p6 should be significantly different from zero. 
3.1.2 Birth Order 
Besides the gender effect, the birth order of children may also affect resource 
allocation, and the direction of the effect is ambiguous. Psychologists and sociologists 
suggest that first-born children have better innate abilities than their later-bom 
siblings (Zajonc 1976). Parents may then allocate more resources to first-bom 
children as their expected return to education is higher. On the other hand, if 
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borrowing is limited and income stream is upward sloping, parents will be financially 
better to raise later-bom children (Kessler 1991). 
Behrman and Taubman (1986) use data from U.S. to test for birth-order effects 
on schooling and earnings. After controlling for family background, they find 
significant birth-order effects favoring firstborns on schooling opportunities. 
Rubalcava and Contreras (2000) use Chilean children's nutritional status to test 
whether birth-order in family and whether being a son or being a daughter reflect how 
parents allocate resources. They find the same result as Thomas (1994) that, mothers 
give more resources to their daughters and fathers to their sons, but the effect is only 
significant for non-oldest daughters and non-oldest sons. 
Apart from the pure birth-order effect, we are also concerned about whether the 
birth order affects gender bias. For example, it is expected that first child will receive 
better education on the average, but is there any significant different between male 
first child and female first child? In addition to the significant gender bias against girls 
on school enrollment and drop-out rates, Ota and Moffatt (2002) find that first-boms 
are significantly less likely to be educated than the other children, and this 
disadvantage appears to apply equally to both genders. Besides, children are more 
likely to go to school if their elder siblings are girls, and less likely if their younger 
siblings are boys, which means older sisters are the most disadvantaged. 
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To test for the birth-order effect, hypothesis 3 is set up: 
Hypothesis 3: Children 's positions among siblings have significant effect on their 
education. The birth order may affect the magnitude of the gender effect. 
The following equation is set up for testing hypothesis 3， 
E丨=a, + P f i i + fiA + M f + M f i i + P A + PAG丨 + X ,p , + � ( 3 ) 
where O/ is a vector of birth order dummies indicating whether the child is the first or 
last child of a family. The coefficients p5 and p6 measure the birth order effect as well 
as the gender-birth order interaction effect. 
3.2 Results on Gender Bias 
In this section, we test Hypotheses 1 and 2 drawing on the CNHS data. Although 
we have a panel dataset, since the over-time changes of child education attainment 
and most of the independent variables are very small, we focus on cross-sectional 
analysis drawing on the 1989 data. However, we also use the 1991 and 1993 data to 
check whether there is any change in terms of gender bias across birth cohorts and 
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ages. 
3.2.1 Overall Results 
In the first column of Table 3, we report the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimate of the determinants of child educational attainment, where the dependent 
variable is the years of schooling of a child. The independent variables are child 
gender, age, age squared, log per capita household income, father's age, mother's age, 
father's education, mother's education, the female household head dummy, the urban 
dummy and provincial dummies. Note that the coefficient of child gender is not 
significantly different from zero, which means that on average there is no gender bias 
on child education. 
However, after adding the interaction term of age and gender in regression (2)， 
we find a gender bias against older girls. Note that the coefficients of both the gender 
dummy and the interaction term are significant, implying a varying gender effect 
across age. In Table 4, we report the estimated effect of being a girl on education for 
each age group, which is y5/+A*age. According to the first two columns of Table 4, a 
six-year-old girl generally receives 0.27 years more education than a six-year-old boy. 
However, the advantage of being a girl on education decreases with age and becomes 
negative at the age of 10. For the oldest children in our sample, i.e., those are 
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fifteen-year-old, girls receive 0.36 fewer years of education than boys. To conclude, 
gender bias against girls is more serious for older children. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is 
supported for older children. 
There could be two ways to interpret the age-varying gender effect. First, 
although there is no bias against younger girls in terms of education, there is a bias 
against older girls. Second, only girls of the older birth cohorts were discriminated 
against, there is no bias against girls for the younger cohorts. One way to differentiate 
the two interpretations is to look at the education of the same cohorts of children 
when they become older. To do this, we apply the same regression models to the 1991 
and 1993 samples, which include children in the 1989 sample, who were two and four 
years older in 1991 and 1993 correspondingly (but no older than 15), as well as some 
new children, who have reached the age of 6 by 1991 and 1993 respectively. 
Regressions using the 1991 and 1993 samples suggest that the gender bias does 
not exist for samples of children that are of the same age but from younger birth 
cohorts. In columns 3 and 6，the coefficients of gender and age*gender are not 
significant. Nonetheless, we calculate the gender bias for each age group according to 
the estimated coefficients on age and age*gender even they are insignificant. The last 
four columns of Table 4, which report the gender bias by age for the 1991 and 1993 
samples, show that there is almost no gender bias. For the 1991 sample, the calculated 
16 
gender biases are all positive, suggesting that girls receive more education than boys 
for each age group. For the 1993 sample, only girls at 13 or older ages receive less 
education than boys, but the magnitudes of these biases are very small compared to 
the gender biases for the same age groups in 1989. These findings suggest that gender 
bias may not be age-specific, but is cohort-specific, i.e., gender bias only exists for 
older birth cohorts. In other words, gender bias is becoming less serious over time. 
Most of the control variables have expected signs in these regressions. The years 
of education increases with age, but at a decreasing rate, with the age having a 
positive coefficient while age squared having a negative coefficient. Children in richer 
household and living in urban areas, where more government resources are allocated, 
have more education than their counterparts. Although the ages of both parents are not 
important for child education, the education levels of both parents are important 
determinants of child education. A little unlike the evidence from other developing 
countries (Alderman et al., 2001; Glewwe and Jacoby, 1995), we find that, although 
the education of both parents has positive and significant coefficients, that on the 
father's education is larger. This probably reflects the patrilineality that exists within 
Chinese society, where fathers make major household decisions, including child 
education.^ Another interesting finding is that children in female-headed households 
5 This is consistent with the findings of Brown and Park (2002) and Li et al. (2005). 
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on average have 0.334 years of more education than children in male-headed 
households. 
3.2.2 Gender Bias in Rural versus Urban Areas 
In the above analysis, we have assumed that the gender bias is the same in rural 
and urban areas. However, the education system and the return to education for boys 
versus girls may be very different in rural and urban areas. Since rural families have 
less social security and investment opportunities, they reply more on having boys for 
old-age security. As a result, rural families may have a relative larger return in 
investing in boys relative to girls, and thus a larger gender bias. 
To analyze whether there is a significant rural and urban difference, we do the 
same estimations to the rural and urban samples separately. Results presented in the 
first two columns of Table 5 show that most of the results of gender bias found in the 
1989 sample (in Table 3) are coming from rural families. Note that the coefficients of 
gender and age*gender interaction are both significant for the rural sample, but they 
are not significant for the urban sample. This shows that there is no detectable gender 
bias in the urban area, and any gender effect found in the 1989 sample is totally due to 
the gender effect in rural China. The rural-urban difference suggests that we need to 
separate the rural and urban samples in the following analysis. When we do the same 
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regressions to the 1991 and 1993 sample, there is no detectable gender bias in both the 
rural and urban samples, suggesting that gender bias indeed has become unimportant 
for children of the younger birth cohorts. 
3.2.3 Household Characteristics and Gender Bias 
We next test Hypothesis 2, i.e., whether the gender bias changes with other 
household characteristics such as the number of children, the gender of the household 
head and the education levels of both parents. We first carry out the analysis using the 
rural sample, and results are reported in Table 6. In column 1, we include both the 
two-or-more children dummy as well as its interaction with gender. The interaction 
term is negative but not significant, which implies that having more than one child 
does not have a significant effect on the magnitude of gender bias in rural China. 
The other four household variables indeed affect gender bias in education in rural 
China. In column 2 of Table 6，we include the interactive term of the female 
household head dummy and gender. Interestingly, the female household head dummy 
becomes insignificant while the interactive term is significantly positive. The 
insignificant female household head dummy means that for boys, there is no 
significant difference in education between female-headed and male-headed families. 
The significant interaction term means that girls from female-headed families 
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received more education than girls from male-headed families. Thus, the significantly 
positive effect of female household head on child education found in previous 
regressions (in Tables 3 and 5) is totally due to more education received by girls from 
female-headed families. Our results are similar to those of Thomas (1994) in that 
female household heads direct more resources to girls, but also different in the sense 
that, male household heads do not necessarily direct more resources to boys.^ One 
reason to explain for the female household head effect on gender bias is that, women 
are less concerned than men with the perpetuation of ancestral lineage, which is the 
main cause of gender bias against girls in China. 
Regressions 3 to 5 in Table 6 show that the education of parents, and in particular 
that of the father, affects the magnitude of the gender bias in rural China. In these 
columns, we add the interaction terms of mother's and father's education with gender. 
With these interaction terms added, both the mother's and father's education levels 
continue to have a positive effect, suggesting that parental education has a positive 
effect on the education of boys. However, the father's education has a larger 
coefficient and is also more significant. Moreover, the coefficients of the interaction 
terms are all positive, and are consistently significant for that of the father, suggesting 
that parental education and in particular the father's education is more important for 
6 If male household heads direct more resources to boys, the coefficient of female household head 
dummy in regression (2) of Table 6 should be significantly negative. 
2 0 
the education of girls, though the effect is very small/ Our finding is again different 
from that of Thomas (1994)，who finds that mother's education has a larger effect on 
her daughter's achievement while father's education has a larger effect on his son's 
achievement. Our finding seems to suggest the father's education is more important in 
increasing the education of daughters. Although men are generally more concerned 
with the perpetuation of ancestral lineage, education can promote the importance of 
gender equality, which accounts for the result of having a better educated father 
increases girls' education. 
In the last column of Table 6，the interactive term of log household income per 
capita and gender is included. Similar to the effect of female household head, log 
household income per capita becomes insignificant while the interactive term is 
significantly positive, which means the level of household income does not have 
significant effect on boys' education, but have significantly positive effect on girls' 
education. In other words, higher household income decreases the size of gender bias. 
This result provides a reason for the disappearing of gender bias over time, which is 
caused by the increasing average household income through the process of economic 
development. 
We carry out the same analysis using the urban sample, and the results are 
7 The coefficients of both interactions are about 0.02, which means when father's or mother's 
education increased by one year, their daughter's education will be increased by 0.02 year. 
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presented in Table 7. We find that neither the gender dummy itself nor its interactions 
with child age and other household characteristics are significant. Our results 
consistently show that there is no gender bias in education in urban China. 
To summarize, the above results show that gender bias against girls only exist in 
rural China and only for children of the older birth cohorts. For the younger cohorts of 
rural children, girls even have more education than boys. We also find that for the 
rural sample, female-headed households tend to favor the education of girls, and both 
the education level of fathers and higher household income per capita help to reduce 
the gender bias. However, we do not find that having the second or more children 
changes the gender bias. 
3.3 Birth Order Effect 
In this section, we test Hypothesis 3 regarding the effect of birth order on gender 
bias. Our measures of birth order include the first and last child dummies, which refer 
to the eldest and youngest child respectively in families with two or more children. 
Therefore, children with the two dummies equals to 0, as well as the two-or-more 
children dummy equals to 1, represents those middle-order children from households 
with three or more children. 
We first present results using the rural sample in Table 8. The result of regression 
2 2 
(1) in Table 8 shows that the two birth order dummies, the first child and last child 
dummies, are positive and significant in rural China in 1989，while the two-or-more 
children dummy is significantly negative. Being the first and last child in a family 
with two or more children increases education by 0.356 and 0.193 years respectively, 
being the only child increases education by 0.241 years.^ These numbers indicate that 
the average education of children in two-child families (0.275) is even larger than the 
education of children from one-child families. In addition, being the first child in a 
large family is more advantageous in terms of education than being the only child. 
Our further analysis shows that the gender bias does not change with the birth 
order dummies. In regression (2) and (3)，we include interactions of gender with these 
birth order dummies. None of these newly added interaction terms are significantly 
different from zero, suggesting that birth order does not affect gender bias in rural 
China. 
The results regarding the urban sample are generally the same as those of the 
rural sample. As shown by regressions in Table 9，being the only child, first child and 
last child all increase education of urban children, though only the effects on the first 
and last child are statistically significant. Interestingly, being the only child in urban 
China does not increase education significantly. Again, none of the interaction terms 
8 The effect of being the only child is the same but in opposite direction with the coefficient of two or 
more children dummy. 
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of gender with birth order are significant. 
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4 Number of children 
4.1 Hypothesis and Empirical Strategy 
After investigating the effect of children's gender and birth order on the 
education level they achieved, we are now going to analyze the effect of total number 
of children on child education. The quantity-quality model was first introduced in 
Becker (1960) and expanded in Becker and Lewis (1973), which suggests that the 
interaction between quantity and quality in the budget constraint leads to rising 
marginal cost of quality with respect to family size, therefore caused the tradeoff 
between quantity and quality of children. 
To clearly identify this effect, the problem of endogeneity between family size 
and resource allocation must be solved. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) are the first to 
use twins as a natural experiment to identify the exogenous increases in family sizes 
in India. They confirm that the exogenous increases in fertility reduce child quality, 
which implies that exogenous improvements in birth control technology would 
increase schooling level of Indian children. Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2004) use 
a richer data set in Norway to do a similar research. The birth of twins is also used as 
instrumental variables to isolate causation, and they find that the negative correlation 
between family size and children's education attainment is only significant when birth 
order is not controlled. In addition, they find that children bom later in the family 
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obtain less education. 
Instead of using education attainment, Lee (2004) uses parents' monetary 
investment in children's education to measure children quality. He uses the first 
child's sex as instrument for fertility to test for quantity quality tradeoff in South 
Korea. The results show that tradeoff still exists after removing endogeneity, although 
not as strong as that estimated by ordinary least square regressions. 
Qian (2004) exploits the exogenous changes in family size caused by relaxation 
of family planning policy in China to estimate the effect of family size on school 
enrollment. She finds that school enrollment for girls from one-child families 
increased by 18 to 20 percent when parents had an additional child, which implies that 
quality is not monotonically decreasing in quantity. 
To analyze this tradeoff issue in China, hypothesis 3 is set up. 
Hypothesis 4: There is Quantity-Quality tradeoff of children, which means children 
from larger family generally receive less education than children from small families. 
To clearly identify the relationship between the number of children and the 
education attained by each child, the problem of endogeneity must be solved. 
Endogeneity exists if both the independent variable and the dependent variable are 
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correlated with some unobserved or uncontrolled variables. This makes the causal 
relationship between independent and dependent variables ambiguous. As both the 
number of children and education resources allocated to each child are household 
choice variables which are correlated with unobserved household preferences, the 
effect of endogeneity cannot be ignored. 
To remove endogeneity, the method of instrumental variables (IVs) is used in this 
study. A good instrumental variable should be highly correlated with the independent 
variables, but not correlated with the dependent variable except through the effect of 
the independent variable. All other household choice variables are not good IVs to 
fertility as they still commit certain level of endogeneity. Twins birth (Rosenzweig 
and Wolpin 1980; Black et. al. 2004) and the sex composition of children (Lee 2004; 
Conley 2004) are two commonly used instruments of fertility in previous literature. 
However, studies using twins data are usually constrained by limited data, and sex 
composition may still be a choice variable given that abortion is not illegal. 
In this thesis, community level variable concerning the birth control policy is 
used.9 Under the assumption that the birth control policy only affects the number of 
children but not directly affects child education, it can serve as an IV. Qian (2004) 
also uses the one-child policy as a natural experiment to detect the effect of 
<)In our data, a community refers to a town, a village, or a neighborhood. 
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exogenous increase in children quantity on children quality. She uses the triple 
interaction term of an individual's sex, date of birth and origin of birth as instrument 
to capture the effect of relaxation of one-child policy in a particular group of children, 
which is positively correlated to the fertility of the affected households. In analyzing 
the quantity quality tradeoff, this study is different from her study in two ways. First, 
Qian (2004) uses the individual data to estimate the effect of increasing fertility on 
individual child, while the household data is used in this study to test whether there is 
quantity quality tradeoff on the average education of all children in the same 
household. Second, while Qian uses the different effects of policy on different groups 
to capture the exogenous change in family size, community variable of one-child 
policy is directly used as instrumental variable in this thesis. 
One-child policy was formally announced in 1979 in China, which only allowed 
each household to have one child in order to control the rapid population growth rate. 
Under this country-level policy, each province or even each community can still have 
some variations on their own policies, depending on their population structures. These 
community-level policy variables are good instruments to fertility as they are highly 
correlated with fertility but not directly correlated with child education. For example, 
if the birth-control policy is more flexible in a community, families in this community 
will have more children on average, but a more flexible birth-control policy will not 
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have any direct effect on the resources distributed to child education by the parents. 
Among these policy variables, we found that the size of fine for an extra-child (F,) has 
the largest correlation with the two or more children dummy in the first-stage of the 
two-staged least squares regressions, and is then used as an instrument for fertility in 
this thesis. With heavier punishment for extra child, the average fertility of families in 
the community will be lower. 
The following equation is first estimated by the Ordinary Least Squares 
regressions (OLS) followed by the two-staged least squares (2SLS) regressions to test 
for the validity of hypothesis 4: 
ei = a i + P iNi+Xi lh+e i (4) 
where e, is the years of education of children i; Ni is a dummy which equals to 1 if the 
family has two or more children; and Xi is a vector of other exogenous variables 
including child gender, age and its squared term, parents' ages and education levels, 
and a dummy indicating whether the family is a urban household. M measures the 
quantity while e, measures the quality of children in the household. If quantity quality 
tradeoff exists, /?/ should be smaller than zero. 
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4.2 Results 
Equation (4) is first estimated by OLS and the results are presented in the first 
column of Table 10. The results show that pi is significantly different from zero in 
1989，which represent there is tradeoff between number of children and the mean 
education of all children in the household. However, this result may be biased due to 
the problem of endogeneity discussed before. The OLS results suggest that total 
number of children in the household is negatively correlated to child education, but it 
can also be the case that families plan to invest less in child education, also prefer to 
have more children due to some unknown factors. If that is the case, the negative 
impact of children quantity on children quality estimated by OLS will be 
over-estimated. To remove endogeneity and identify the true effect of children 
quantity on children quality, 2SLS is used instead. 
The first stage of the 2SLS regressions estimates the correlation between fertility 
and the instruments: 
Ni = a i - ^ p , F i + X i p 2 ^ e i (5) 
where F, is the instrument to total number of children and Xi is the same vector as 
equation (4). The result is presented in Table 11. F,- is found to be significant and 
negatively correlated with N“ which is the same as our expectation. Recall that a good 
instrument should be highly correlated with the independent variable but not directly 
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correlated with the dependent variable. The first-stage of 2SLS regressions shows that 
Fi is highly correlated with fertility, and it is obvious that individual household's 
choice on child education will not affect the birth-control policy of the community. 
Therefore, it is suitable to use Fi as IV for fertility. 
The second column of Table 10 shows the second stage results of the two-stage 
least squares regressions of equation (4). After removing endogeneity by the 
instrumental variables approach, we can still find significant tradeoff between 
quantity and education level of children, and the negative effect is even 1.28 years 
larger than that estimated by OLS, which means children from one-child families got 
one year more education than children from families with two or more children on the 
average. This implies that the OLS estimates are actually positively biased due to the 
problem of endogeneity, that is, families that planned to have more children also 
planned to educate their children more due to unobserved or omitted variables. 
In China, most parents treat children as investment for old-age security. These 
parents may choose to have more children in order to diversify risk, so that they will 
still have old-age support if one of the children is not able to earn money due to health 
or other constraints. At the same time, these parents will invest a large proportion of 
resources in child education as they believe that education level is positively 
correlated with the children's future income. With this unobserved preference of 
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parents, the correlation between number and education of children estimated by 
simple OLS regressions will be positively biased, resulting in a smaller or even no 
quantity-quality tradeoff. After removing endogeneity by IV method, the results of 
2SLS regressions reflect the true size of quantity and quality tradeoff: the education 
levels of children in one-child families are 1.37 year more than those at the same ages 
but from families with two or more children in 1989. 
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5 Conclusions 
In this thesis, we have studied the child education attainment in China. We first 
examine the existence of gender bias in China. We find that gender bias against girls 
only exist in rural China and only for children of the older birth cohorts. For the 
younger cohorts of rural children, girls even have more education than boys. 
In addition to examining gender bias across age groups, we are also interested in 
whether family characteristics and child birth order, which may affect resource 
allocation on child education, have significant effects on gender bias. We find that for 
the rural sample, female-headed households tend to favor the education of girls, and 
both the education level of fathers and higher household income per capita help to 
reduce the gender bias. However, we do not find that having one more child or the 
mother's education affects the magnitude of gender bias. Our further analysis shows 
that although both the first and last births in a family receive more education than 
their siblings, girls of the first and last births are neither favored nor discriminated in 
terms of education. 
Finally, we examine whether there is a quantity-quality tradeoff of children. By 
directly employing the one-child policy variable as an instrumental variable, we find 
that there is indeed a quantity-quality tradeoff of children. Further analysis that draws 
on even better instrumental variables is needed in the future. 
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Our analysis has some policy implications. Our empirical findings seem to 
suggest that the gender bias has become less serious and even disappearing over time. 
Thus, no specific policy is needed to raise the education level of girls. Since there is a 
quantity-quality tradeoff, the one-child policy of China may indeed have helped to raise 
the average quality of children and thus their long-term earnings ability and the growth 
of the Chinese economy. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Children's Data Used in Section 3 (1989) 
Variable Number of Mean Standard Minimum Maximum 
observations Deviation Value Value 
Years of education 2417 4.1734 2.6475 0 H 
Gender of child 2417 0.4820 0.4998 0 1 
(boy=0, girl=l) 
Age of child 2417 10.7605 2.8799 6 15 
Per capita income 2417 971.5823 790.5533 4.9642 8231.451 
Father's age 2417 40.2263 6.5211 24 68 
Mother's age 2417 38.1382 5.7943 22 62 
Father's education level 2417 6.5742 3.4774 0 18 
Mother's education level 2417 4.2913 3.8726 0 17 
Female household head dummy 2417 0.0910 0.2877 0 1 
(male=0, f emale : 1) 
Urban dummy 2417 0.2110 0.4081 0 1 
Two or more children dummy 2417 0.6396 0.4802 0 1 
(two or more: 1, one=0) 
First child dummy 2417 0.2065 0.40481 0 1 
Last child dummy 2417 0.2350 0.4241 0 I 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Children's Data Used in Section 4 (1989) 
Variable Number of Mean Standard Maximum Minimum 
observations Deviation Value Value 
Years of education 4 . 1 9 3 2 2 9 2 . 6 7 4 7 7 3 0 H 
Gender of child 1920 0.484375 0.499886 0 1 
(boy=0, girl=l) 
Age of child 1920 10.43698 2.797152 6 15 
Father's age 1920 39.76094 6.45614 26 68 
Mother's age 1920 37.71719 5.754733 22 62 
Father's education level 丨92o 6.600521 3.358282 0 18 
Mother's education level 1920 4.216146 3.830658 0 17 
Urban dummy 1920 0.173958 0.379172 0 1 
Two or more children dummy 1920 0.671875 0.469653 0 1 
(two or more=l, one=0) 
Amount of fine for extra child 1920 1506.293 1531.127 0 9999 
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Table 3: Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Examining the Effect of Gender on Child's Education in China  
Dependent variable: Total Years of Education 
\99\ 1993 
⑴ （2) (3) � (5) (6) 
Gender of child -0.057 0.692*** 0.056 -0.014 0.062 0.369* 
(boy=0，girl=l) (1.04) (3.27) (1.04) (0.07) (1.19) (1.90) 
Age of child 1.165*** 1.196*** 0.939*** 0.935*** 0.830*** 0.839*** 
(14.26) (14.60) (11.76) (11.64) (11.00) (11.10) 
Age squared -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.006 -0.006 0.001 0.001 
(4.76) (4.75) (1.51) (1.51) (0.29) (0.36) 
Age*gender -0.070*** 0.007 -0.029 
(3.67) (0.35) (1.64) 
Log income per capita 0.072** 0.073** 0.140*** 0.140*** 0.128*** 0.127*** 
(2.17) (2.20) (3.94) (3.94) (4.78) (4.76) 
Father's age 0.012 0.011 -0.001 -0.001 0.012 0.012 
(1.35) (1.30) (0.13) (0.14) (1.41) (1.42) 
Mother's age 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.009 -0.004 -0.005 
(0.50) (0.56) (0.84) (0.84) (0.47) (0.48) 
Father's education level 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 
(8.23) (8.21) (4.86) (4.87) (3.41) (3.40) 
Mother's education level 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 
(5.32) (5.33) (3.04) (3.04) (5.68) (5.73) 
Female household head 0.330*** 0.334*** -0.054 -0.054 0.219** 0.216** 
(male=0’female=l) (3.37) (3.41) (0.50) (0.50) (2.14) (2.10) 
Urban dummy 0.330*** 0.330*** 0.368*** 0.368*** 0.358*** 0.362*** 
(4.48) (4.50) (5.08) (5.08) (5.18) (5.24) 
Observations 2417 2417 2229 2229 2123 2123 
R-squared 0.74 0.75 0.77 0.77 0.82 0.82 
Numbers in parentheses are absolute values of t statistics. Significance levels of 0.1，0.05 and 0.01 are noted by *, **, 
and ***. All regressions include provincial dummies. 
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Table 4: Gender Effects of Different-year-old Girls in 1989，1991 and 1993 
Year of birth 1989 1991 1993 
Age Gender bias Age Gender bias Age Gender bias 
1987 6 0.195 
1986 7 0.166 
1985 6 0.028 8 0.137 
1984 7 0.035 9 0.108 
1983 6 0.272 8 0.042 10 0.079 
1982 7 0.202 9 0.049 11 0.05 
1981 8 0.132 10 0.056 12 0.021 
1980 9 0.062 11 0.063 13 -0.008 
1979 10 -0.008 12 0.07 14 -0.037 
1978 11 -0.078 13 0.077 15 -0.066 
1977 12 -0.148 14 0.084 
1976 13 -0.218 15 0.091 
1975 14 -0.288 
15 -0.358 
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Table 5: Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Examining the Effect of Gender on Child's Education in China  
Dependent variable: Total Years of Education 
im \993  
Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
Gender of child 0.873*** 0.076 -0.156 0.549 0.341 0.491 
(boy=0, girl=l) (3.56) (0.20) (0.65) (1.39) (1.55) (1.19) 
Age of child 1.218*** 1.096*** 0.904*** 1.061*** 0.889*** 0.679*** 
(12.79) (7.72) (9.80) (7.02) (10.35) (4.29) 
Age squared -0.020*** -0.010 -0.005 -0.006 -0.001 0.009 
(4.57) (1.46) (1.26) (0.88) (0.35) (1.26) 
Age*gender -0.088*** -0.006 0.016 -0.032 -0.032 -0.024 
(4.01) (0.18) (0.73) (0.90) (1.58) (0.64) 
Log income per capita 0.084** -0.078 0.169*** -0.120 0.144*** 0.024 
(2.32) (0.91) (4.35) (1.36) (4.99) (0.32) 
Father's age 0.011 -0.009 -0.001 -0.011 -0.001 0.055*** 
(1.06) (0.65) (0.07) (0.72) (0.11) (3.08) 
Mother's age 0.000 0.051*** 0.006 0.037** 0.003 -0.009 
(0.02) (3.03) (0.51) (2.03) (0.27) (0.44) 
Father's education level 0.091*** 0.032** 0.058*** 0.010 0.033*** 0.026 
(7.94) (2.15) (5.02) (0.60) (3.03) (1.49) 
Mother's education level 0.041*** 0.081*** 0.024** 0.053*** 0.048*** 0.050*** 
(3.73) (5.53) (2.36) (3.25) (4.92) (2.89) 
Female household head 0.312** 0.195 -0.006 -0.111 0.272** 0.049 
(male=0, female=l) (2.48) (1.44) (0.05) (0.75) (2.18) (0.28) 
Observations 1907 510 1781 448 1683 440 
R-squared 0.71 0.87 0.75 0.87 0.80 0.86 
Numbers in parentheses are absolute values of t statistics. Significance levels of 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 are noted by *, 
and ***. All regressions include provincial dummies. 
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Table 6: Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Examining the Effect of Gender on Child's Education Rural Area of 
China (1989) 
Dependent variable: Total Years of Education  
i n (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gender of child 0.978*** 0.852*** 0.351 0.558** 0.279 -0.028 
(boy=0, girl=l) (3.78) (3.48) (1.19) (2.05) (0.93) (0.06) 
Age of child 1.238*** 1.217*** 1.215*** 1.205*** 1.207*** 1.214*** 
(12.75) (12.78) (12.78) (12.65) (12.69) (12.76) 
Age squared -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
(4.68) (4.54) (4.59) (4.49) (4.54) (4.53) 
Age*gender -0.085*** -0.089*** -0.075*** -0.075*** -0.070*** -0.088*** 
(3.87) (4.05) (3.35) (3.36) (3.11) (4.00) 
Log income per capita 0.081** 0.083** 0.081** 0.083** 0.081** 0.019 
(2.22) (2.29) (2.25) (2.29) (2.25) (0.39) 
Father's age 0.091*** 0.092*** 0.061*** 0.091*** 0.068*** 0.090*** 
(8.00) (8.02) (4.15) (7.97) (4.39) (7.92) 
Mother's age 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.018 0.027* 0.041*** 
(3.57) (3.74) (3.74) (1.26) (1.85) (3.70) 
Father's education level 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.011 
(1.01) (0.99) (0.96) (1.04) (0.97) (1.02) 
Mother's education level -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
(0.00) (0.12) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Female household head 0.305** 0.095 0.330*** 0.313** 0.326*** 0.305** 
(male=0, female=l) (2.42) (0.55) (2.63) (2.49) (2.60) (2.43) 
Two or more children dummy 0.025 
(two or more=l, one=0) (0.26) 
Two or more children dummy -0.192 
•gender (1.41) 
Female household head dummy 0.446* 
•gender (1.81) 
Father's education level 0.062*** 0.048** 
•gender (3.12) (2.18) 
Mother's education level 0.048*** 0.029 
*gender (2.65) (1.42) 
Log income per capita 0.139** 
•gender (2.03) 
Observations 1907 1907 1907 1907 1907 1907 
R-squared 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.71 
Numbers in parentheses are absolute values of t statistics. Significance levels of 0.1，0.05 and 0.01 are noted by *， 
**, and ***. All regressions include provincial dummies. 
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Table 7: Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Examining the Effect of Gender on Child's Education Urban Area of 
China (1989) 
Dependent variable: Total Years of Education  
in m � � (5) (6� 
Gender of child 0.127 0.082 -0.196 -0.192 -0.275 -1.456 
(boy=0, girl=l) (0.34) (0.22) (0.44) (0.44) (0.60) (1.27) 
Age of child 1.078*** 1.109*** 1.094*** 1.092*** 1.092*** 1 102*** 
(7.50) (7.81) (7.71) (7.69) (7.69) (7.77) 
Age squared -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0 010 
(1.34) (1.55) (1.46) (1.45) (1.45) (1.52) 
Age*gender -0.003 -0.012 -0.001 0.002 0.003 -0 009 
(0.09) (0.37) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.25) 
Log income per capita -0.067 -0.081 -0.086 -0.084 -0.087 -0.189 
(0.77) (0.93) (1.00) (0.97) (1.00) (1.62) 
Father's age 0.032** 0.033** 0.020 0.033** 0.025 0.031** 
(2.13) (2.17) (1.02) (2.18) (1.22) (2.08) 
Mother's age 0.082*** 0.081*** 0.082*** 0.068*** 0.072*** 0.081*** 
(5.58) (5.54) (5.58) (3.76) (3.66) (5.55) 
Father's education level -0.010 -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
(0.71) (0.64) (0.62) (0.68) (0.65) (0.65) 
Mother's education level 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.052*** 
(3.03) (3.06) (2.99) (3.02) (3.00) (3.07) 
Female household head 0.210 0.017 0.196 0.198 0.198 0.194 
(male=0, female=l) (1.53) (0.09) (1.44) (1.46) (1.45) (1.43) 
Two or more children dummy 0.174 
(two or more= 1，one=0) (1.23) 
Two or more children dummy -0.187 
•gender (0.95) 
Female household head dummy 0.373 
*gender (1.44) 
Father's education level 0.027 0.016 
•gender (1.07) (0.52) 
Mother's education level 0.027 0.020 
•gender (1.18) (0.72) 
Log income per capita 0.224 
•gender (1.41) 
Observations 510 510 510 510 510 510 
R-squared 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 
Numbers in parentheses are absolute values of t statistics. Significance levels of 0.1，0.05 and 0.01 are noted by *, 
**，and ***. All regressions include provincial dummies. 
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Table 8: Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Examining the Effect of Gender on Child's Education in 
Rural Area of China (1989) 
Dependent variable: Total Years of Education  
in (2} (3) 
Gender of child 0.828*** 0.815*** 0.837*** 
(boy=0, girl=l) (3.37) (3.31) (3.14) 
Age of child 1.187*** 1.189*** 1.187*** 
(12.14) (12.17) (12.14) 
Age squared -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
(4.22) (4.27) (4.22) 
Age*gender -0.082*** -0.078*** -0.083*** 
(3.75) (3.47) (3.63) 
Log income per capita 0.077** 0.075** 0.077** 
(2.11) (2.06) (2.11) 
Father's age 0.012 0.012 0.012 
(1.13) (1.12) (1.13) 
Mother's age 0.004 0.004 0.004 
(0.33) (0.35) (0.33) 
Father's education level 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 
(8.16) (8.15) (8.15) 
Mother's education level 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 
(3.37) (3.35) (3.37) 
Female household head 0.313** 0.312** 0.313** 
(male=0, female=l) (2.49) (2.48) (2.49) 
Two or more children dummy -0.241*** -0.248*** -0.241*** 
(two o r m o r e = l , o n e = 0 ) (2.59) (2.66) (2.59) 
First child dummy 0.356*** 0.452*** 0.356*** 
(3.59) (3.45) (3.59) 
Last child dummy 0.193* 0.199** 0.199* 
(1.93) (1.98) (1.65) 
First child dummy*gender -0.175 
(1.12) 
Last child dummy*gender -0.014 
(0.09) 
Observations 1907 1907 1907 
R-squared 0.72 0.72 0.72 
Numbers in parentheses are absolute values of t statistics. Significance levels of 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 
are noted by *，**, and ***. All regressions include provincial dummies. 
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Table 9: Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Examining the Effect of Gender on Child's Education in 
Urban Area of China (1989) ：  Dependent variable: Total Years of Education  
i n (2) (3) 
Gender of child 0.096 0.115 0 146 
(boy=0，girl=l) (0.26) (0.31) (0.38) 
Age of child 1.027*** 1.026*** 1 028*** (7.10) (7.08) (7.10) 
Age squared -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 (1.01) (0.98) (0.99) 
Age*gender -0.007 -0.011 -0.010 (0.22) (0.32) (0.28) 
Log income per capita -0.083 -0.085 -0.084 (0.95) (0.98) (0.97) 
Father's age -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
(0.65) (0.68) (0.69) 
Mother's age 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.056*** 
(3.26) (3.28) (3.25) 
Father's education level 0.032** 0.032** 0.032** 
(2.11) (2.12) (2.10) 
Mother's education level 0.082*** 0.081*** 0.082*** 
(5.55) (5.54) (5.55) 
Female household head 0.205 0.203 0.207 
(male=0, female=l) (1.51) (1.49) (1.52) 
Two or more children dummy -0.253 -0.249 -0.258 
(two or more=l ,one=0) (1.42) (1.39) (1.44) 
First child dummy 0.493** 0.422* 0.492** 
(2.48) (1.66) (2.47) 
Last child dummy 0.370* 0.366* 0.429* 
(1.87) (1.86) (1.87) 
First child dummy*gender 0.120 
(0.45) 
Last child dummy*gender -0.126 
(0.51) 
Observations 510 510 510 
R-squared 0.87 0.87 0.87 
Numbers in parentheses are absolute values of t statistics. Significance levels of 0.1，0.05 and 0.01 are 
noted by *，**，and ***. All regressions include provincial dummies. 
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Table 10: Ordinary Least Squares and Two-Stage Least Squares Regressions Examining the Effect of 
Number of Children on Education of Children in China (1989) Dependent variable: Mean Years of Education  
OLS  
Two or more children dummy -0.092** -1.370*** 
(two or more=l, one-0) (1-97) P .29 ) 
Gender of child 0.103** 0.115** 
(boy=0, girl=l) (2.54) (2.38) 
Age of child 0.669*** 1.011*** 
(10.76) (7.62) 
Age squared 0.010*** -0.005 
(3.44) (0.86) 
Father's age -0.002 -0.015* 
(0.38) (1.69) 
Mother's age 0.027*** 0.025*** 
(3.66) (2.89) 
Father's education level 0.035*** 0.033*** 
(4.94) (3.88) 
Mother's education level 0.037*** 0.010 
(5.59) (0.91) 
Urban dummy 0.242*** 0.141* 
(4.24) (1.88) 
Observations 1920 1920 
R-squared 0.89 0.85 
Numbers in parentheses are absolute values of t statistics. Significance levels of 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 are 
noted by *, **，and ***. All regressions include provincial dummies. 
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Table 11: Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Examining the Determinants of Having the Second Child 
in China (First-stage of 2SLS) (1989) 
Dependent variable: Two or more children dummy 
Amount of fine for extra child -0.443*** 
/10000 (IV) (5.81) 
Proportion of girls in the 0.012 
household (0.59) 
Mean age of children 0.272*** 
(9.14) 
Mean age squared -0.012*** 
(8.59) 
Father's age -0.008** 
(2.57) 
Mother's age -0.003 
(0.85) 
Father's education level -0.002 
(0.47) 
Mother's education level -0.018*** 
(5.58) 




Numbers in parentheses are absolute values of t statistics. Significance levels of 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 are 
noted by *，**，and ***. All regressions include provincial dummies. 
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